Introduction
The literature dealing with dynamic wage bargaining on the rm level in a general equilibrium framework usually makes the following assumptions: 1 i Unemployment bene ts are not lump-sum transfers but a function of the wage level. ii The functional relationship is such that individual unemployment bene ts are a fraction of the average wage level. iii Unemployment bene ts are the same for persons being already unemployed in the bargaining period and persons getting unemployed in later time periods. Due to the presumed large numberof rms and labor unions, assumption ii implies that the bargaining parties consider unemployment bene ts to be exogenous. As a further consequence bene ts are identical for all persons getting unemployed in the same period independent of their previous workplace. Assumption iii implies that unemployment bene ts do not depend on the time period in which a worker becomes unemployed. This would bethe case if unemployment bene ts of all unemployed are related to the actual average wage level. We nd assumption i to be plausible for most economies one exception being Great Britain, but argue that assumptions ii and iii have to bemodi ed. For many real-world economies these assumptions are not a valid description of the institutional setup, since unemployment bene ts are usually tied to the previous level of individually earned wages. 2 In this case one could expect that labor unions will not consider unemployment bene ts to be exogenous but will take account of the fact that higher wage claims today imply higher unemployment bene ts tomorrow. Moreover, unemployment bene ts of those being unemployed in the bargaining period will di er from bene ts of those who get unemployed in later periods. In this paper we show h o w the analysis and the results are modi ed if assumptions 1 ii and iii are altered. In the comparison of our results with those of the literature, we focus on the case usually considered in the literature, namely the case with risk-neutral workers and Cobb-Douglas technology. In section 2.1 the theoretical framework is developed and the aggregate wage-setting curve is derived. Section 2.2 compares our results for the wage-setting curve with those obtained under other unemployment compensation systems. Section 2.3 describes the general equilibrium and section 3 concludes.
2 The Model
Derivation of the Aggregate Wage-Setting Curve
We consider a closed economy with monopolistic competition in the goods market and wage bargains taking place at the rm level. There are n identical rms and an equal number of identical unions. All rms are unionized and bargain with their own union. Since the numberof rms and unions is large, the bargaining parties neglect the consequences of their decisions for the rest of the economy. The values of the objective functions of rms and unions in the case of a successful bargain in period t are denoted as t and Z t , respectively. If an agreement cannot be reached the corresponding values are t and Z t . The bargaining outcome is obtained by maximizing the asymmetric Nash product t = , Z t , Z t , t , t 1, , where describes the bargaining power of labor unions 0 1. After the determination of wages employers unilaterally choose the level of employment which guarantees the highest pro ts. This right to manage" of employers is taken into account in the wage bargain. Consider rst the employer's side of the wage bargain. If pro ts are earned at the end of each period, a rm's discounted pro ts at the beginning of period t are To determine the outcome of the Nash bargain, V t , e V t has to bespeci ed. The model under consideration is deterministic in nature, i.e. stochastic shocks are neglected. Therefore, an exogenous quit rate is introduced into the model to allow for job turnover in the steady state. Let denote the proportion of employees who leave employment and enter unemployment in each period. With the unemployment rate u being constant in the steady state, the probability o f an unemployed person for nding a new job, a, is endogenously determined by a = 1 , u u :
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An increase in the unemployment rate reduces the probability of getting a new job, i.e. @a=@u 0, whereas a rise in the quit rate enhances the reemployment prospects, i.e. @a=@ 0. It is assumed that wages and employment are both determined at the beginning of the period but payments wages or unemployment bene ts are made at the end of the period. Bene ts for an unemployed person depend on the respective wage earned in his last occupation. In the steady state u constant, at the beginning of any period t the expected lifetime utility V t of an individual who remains employed in period t in the rm under consideration is given by the following present value expression:
where r is the discount rate of workers, which m a y di er from the discount rate of rms , and U denotes the utility function of income. V t+1 is the expected lifetime utility of a person at the beginning of period t + 1 who gets unemployed at the beginning of period t+1 and has previously worked in the rm under consideration. . 10 W 1 denotes the wage paid in rms di erent from the one under consideration. B 1 are unemployment bene ts for persons who previously worked at a rm di erent from that under consideration. V 1 is the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed person whose last workplace was at a rm elsewhere. In eq. 8 it is implicitly assumed that a person leaving the poolof unemployed will never again get a job in the rm under consideration, since the probability of this event is virtually zero due to the large numberof rms. Furthermore, in this model it is assumed that a direct switch from one rm to another is not possible. Workers who want t o c hange their employer rst have to enter the poolofthe unemployed.
As explained in the introduction we consider an economy where unemployment bene ts of individuals are related to their own previous earnings, thereby modifying assumption ii which states that bene ts are a function of the average wage level. Hence, for those getting unemployed in period t+1 their own wage of period t is relevant for the determination of bene t levels. This has to be taken into account in equations 8 and 10 implying that B t+1 = bW t and B 1t+1 = bW 1t , where b is the exogenous replacement ratio 0 b 1. Since at the rm level a distinction is made between wages paid by di erent rms, this modi cation implies that unemployment bene ts may vary between unemployed persons who were previously employed in di erent rms. Making unemployment bene ts dependent o n previous individual earnings also implies that assumption iii has to be altered. Since wage levels before the bargaining period may di er from wages prevailing afterwards, it follows that also unemployment bene ts may b e di erent across time periods.
To show the consequences of a modi cation of assumptions ii and iii, we focus on the in nite bargain case with T ! 1 , which has been considered by L a yard, Nickell 1990 and Hoel 1991. 5 It is assumed that a symmetric equilibrium prevailed before the bargaining period t = t 0 implying that wages and unemployment bene ts were the same for all individuals. At the beginning of period t 0 in each rm unique wage and employment levels are chosen for this and all future periods. As a result the new steady state will already be reached in period t 0 . Omitting time indices for steady state values, equations 7 to 10 become: where B t 0 denotes the level of unemployment bene ts for those persons, who entered unemployment before or in the bargaining period. Since bene ts depend on wages paid by the previous employer, one must distinguish the expected lifetime utility of a person who gets unemployed after the bargaining period and has previously worked in the rm under consideration, V , from the expected lifetime utility of a person who gets unemployed before or in the bargaining period, e V . The reason is that wage levels and hence unemployment bene ts before and after the wage bargain may di er. From equations 11 to 15 and eq. 6 it can be deduced that The following analysis would also be valid in a somewhat more general model variant with isoelastic utility functions of workers UW = W = , which has also been considered in the literature. To simplify the exposition we restrict the analysis to the case with = 1 . In the current debate about remedies for the unemployment problem it is often claimed that unemployment bene ts must bereduced to lower wage pressure and hence unemployment. With respect to B t 0 , which are unemployment bene ts of those who are unemployed in the bargaining period, such claims seem to beconrmed by eq. 24, since a reduction of B t 0 leads to a lower wage-setting curve. Interestingly, the opposite result is obtained if the replacement ratio b is changed and unemployment bene ts B t 0 are held constant. Such a situation may arise if in the bargaining period the government announces that unemployment bene ts of those who get unemployed after the bargaining period will be reduced, whereas the payments to the currently unemployed remain unchanged. As can be seen from eq. 24, a reduction in the replacement ratio b with given B t 0 leads to higher wage pressure. The reason for this surprising result is that a reduction of b lowers the costs of a wage increase more than the corresponding gains, thus provoking higher wage claims at a given unemployment rate. 9 Next we compute the slope of the wage-setting curve, which due to eq. 24 leads to dW u du = it is easy to show that 1 , b g u j u=u . Hence, for u ! u the wage-setting curve has a negative slope, i.e. dW u =du 0. Since for u ! u the expression ! u , 1 approaches zero, it follows from eq. 25 that for u ! u the slope of the wage-setting curve approaches ,1.
For u = 1 one obtains g u = + r = . Thus, two cases must bedistinguished.
If 1 , b + r = the wage-setting curve does not have a positive slope at u = 1. Together with g 0 u j u=u 0 it can be concluded that the wage-setting curve falls over the whole range u; 1 . However, if 1 , b + r = the wagesetting curve has a positive slope at u = 1. In this case there exists a negatively and positively sloped bough of the wage-setting curve. 9 The costs and gains of a wage increase are given by V W , e V N 0 W and V 0 W N, respectively, both expressions depending on b. The decline in costs is due to the fact that V declines by more than e V which is due to di erent discount factors the probability for getting unemployment bene ts bW is higher for an employed person than for a person who is unemployed in the bargaining period and must be reemployed before bene ts bW are obtained in the following unemployment spells. The decline in the gains of a wage increase is due to the fact that future bene ts, which depend on current w ages, are rising less if b is lower.
To obtain some intuition for the slope of the wage-setting curve consider rst a situation with low unemployment. An increase in the unemployment rate then implies worse outside opportunities at the rm level at given wages W 1 , thereby reducing wage pressure. In the general equilibrium this e ect is reinforced by the fact that wages W 1 in all rms decline and that future unemployment bene ts, which are linked to wages, will be lower. However, the unemployment rate may eventually reach a critical level at which unions drive up their wage demands again if the unemployment rate increases. Intuitively this can be explained in the following way: On the one hand, a higher unemployment rate increases the weight of current unemployment bene ts B t 0 in the consideration of unions, and also increases the weight of future bene ts bW of those who remain at work in the bargaining period. On the other hand, future unemployment bene ts decline if real wages determined by the bargaining parties go down. If real wages are low and the unemployment rate is high enough, the welfare loss of an additional unemployed member may become lower than the welfare gain of higher wages for those who remain at work remember that B t 0 is exogenously given. In this case wage demands of unions increase. Since all unions behave identical, average wages go up improving the outside opportunities of workers. This gives rise to higher wage demands again. As a result, the aggregate wage-setting curve may h a ve a positively sloped bough.
Comparison with other Unemployment Compensation Schemes a Earnings-related bene ts as a function of the actual average wage level:
It is useful to contrast the wage-setting curve implied by eq. 24 with the wagesetting curve which results under the usual assumptions ii and iii of the literature. These assumptions correspond to an unemployment compensation scheme in which bene ts of all unemployed are always related to the actual average wage 
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A permissible solution requires that u 2 0; 1 and therefore 1,b 1. 11 Due to eq. 27 a reduction in b leads to lower equilibrium unemployment. The reason is that in this model variant a l o wer b not only reduces future unemployment bene ts but also bene ts of the currently unemployed. A vertical wage-setting curve has often been used in the literature since it is in line with the stylized fact that labor demand shifts caused by technological change have no long-run impact on the level of unemployment. 12 To obtain a vertical curve not only must beassumed that workers have isoelastic utility functions and that production is of the Cobb-Douglas type, but, in addition, it is also necessary 10 Eq. 22a results, for instance, in the model of Layard and Nickell 1990, p. 781. 11 With 0 the solution u = 0 is not possible. A comparison with the lowest permissible rate of unemployment u of the general model reveals that u u .
12 See, for instance, Layard et al. 1991. to restrict the analysis to a model variant with a special institutional setup of the unemployment compensation system.
b Earnings-related b ene ts as a function of the average wage level which prevailed when getting unemployed:
The crucial assumption for a vertical wage-setting curve is assumption iii which requires that unemployment bene ts are the same for persons being already unemployed in the bargaining period and persons getting unemployed in later time periods. The importance of this assumption can be seen by analyzing a model variant where this assumption is not made, but assumption ii is maintained. This amounts to an unemployment compensation scheme in which unemployment bene ts are related to the average wage level which prevailed during the last employment spell of the respective person. In this case in eq. 22 the term bW must bereplaced by bW 1 , whereas B t 0 denotes bene ts which are related to the previous average wage level prevalent before the wage bargain took place, i.e. Taking account of the explanations in appendix A.1, the wage-setting equation can betransformed to:
For f W u 0 the denominator of eq. 24b must bepositive. For this to hold it is su cient that u u, since in this case !u , 1 0. 13 From a comparison of eqs. 24 and 24b in the intervall u; 1 it follows that wage pressure is ceteris paribus higher if unemployment bene ts are a function of individual wages instead of the average wage level. Since the denominator in eq. 24 is smaller, for all permissible values of u the respective wage-setting curve lies strictly above the wage-setting curve implied by eq. 24b. The intuition for this result is that unions take into account that higher wages today mean higher bene ts for its members tomorrow if unemployment bene ts depend on individual wages. This leads to higher wage pressure. Similar to eq. 24 it also follows from eq. 24b that a reduction in the future replacement ratio b at current bene t levels B t 0 increases wage pressure. It can therefore be concluded that for this surprising result to hold it is not necessary that unemployment bene ts depend on individual wage levels. where the function gu is de ned after eq. 26. As a result, in the intervall u; 1 the slope of the wage-setting curve f W u has the same sign as the slope of the wage-setting curve W u determined by eq. 24. 24c For W u 0 it is required that !u , 1 0. Hence, the corresponding wagesetting curve is de ned for the same intervall u; 1 as the wage-setting curve in eq. 24. The wage-setting curve implied by eq. 24c falls over the whole range u 2 u; 1 since unemployment bene ts do not depend on real wages determined in the bargaining process. If it is assumed that B = B t 0 , it can be derived that the wage-setting curve de ned by eq. 24c lies strictly below W u de ned by eq. 24. 14 The reason is that rising wages do not lead to higher unemployment bene ts, which cet. par. leads to lower wage pressure.
The General Equilibrium
In this section we consider the general equilibrium which results with the wagesetting curve derived in eq. 24. For the general equilibrium also the price-setting curve must betaken into account. With isoelastic goodsdemand, Cobb-Douglas technology and the assumption of a symmetric equilibrium the price-setting equation is
28 where K and L denote the total stock of capital and the labor supply. It is evident that the price-setting curve has a positive slope in real wage-unemployment space, with lim u!1 H 0 u = 1. Since the wage-setting curve of eq. 24 has a nite value at W u j u=1 and since lim u!u W 0 u = ,1 it follows that an equilibrium exists.
If W u is falling over the whole range u; 1 , the uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed. If the wage-setting curve has a positive bough over some part of the interval, multiple equilibria may exist from a theoretical point of view depending on the parameter constellation. However, if in simulation experiments plausible ranges for the various parameters are chosen, it turns out that a unique equilibrium is obtained. Figure 1 Consider as an example gure 1a where two wage-setting curves with di erent replacement ratios b are plotted. 15 . As can be seen from gure 1a both wagesetting curves have a positive bough. Furthermore, the wage-setting curve with the lower replacement ratio b = 0:3 lies above the wage-setting curve with the higher replacement ratio b = 0 :6. In gure 1b the price-setting curve is depicted. It can beseen that the slope of this curve is getting very steep with high unemployment rates and for u ! 1 approaches in nity. Figure 1c shows only a small range for the unemployment rate where wage-setting curve and price-setting curve intersect in the general equilibrium. Since to the right of the intersection point the price-setting curve lies above the wage-setting curve and since with higher unemployment rates the slope of the price-setting curve increases more than the slope of the wage-setting curve along the positive bough, a unique equilibrium is obtained. Figure 1c con rms the analytical result that a lower replacement ratio for future unemployment bene ts leads to higher wage pressure and hence higher unemployment. However, the e ect of a signi cant reduction in b from 0:6 to 0:3 on the unemployment rate is rather small. 16 
Summary and Conclusions
We show h o w the analysis in a dynamic wage bargaining model has to be modi ed if in contrast to the literature it is assumed that rstly unemployment bene ts are tied to the previous level of individually earned wages and secondly unemployment bene ts of those already unemployed at the beginning of the bargaining period di er from bene ts of those who get unemployed in later periods. For this aim we develop a dynamic wage bargaining framework which encompasses conventional" models of the literature as special cases. Focusing on a model with Cobb-Douglas production technology and risk-neutral workers, we demonstrate that in our model the result of a vertical wage-setting curve i s not obtained. It is shown that a crucial prerequisite for a vertical wage-setting curve is the assumption that unemployment bene ts do not depend on the time period in which a w orker becomes unemployed. If this assumption is abandoned, the wage-setting curve exhibits one of the following shapes depending on the parameter values: either the curve has a negative slope over the whole range of permissible unemployment rates or the curve exhibits a negative slope for low unemployment rates and has a positive bough for high ones. As a further result it follows from our analysis that wage claims are cet. par. higher if unemployment bene ts are a function of individual wages instead of the average wage level. The reason is that labor unions take into account that higher wages today imply higher bene ts for its members tomorrow which leads to higher wage pressure. We also examine how the wage-setting curve is a ected by a v ariation in the parameters. For instance, we consider the consequences of labor market reforms which reduce unemployment bene ts of those who get unemployed after the bargaining period, but keep the bene ts of the currently unemployed unchanged. We show that such a policy leads to higher wage pressure and thus increases the equilibrium rate of unemployment. If this is taken into account in eq. A.2, the aggregate wage-setting curve can be written as in eq. 24.
A.2 The slope of the wage-setting curve 
